Harvest now, decrypt later
Recording encrypted traffic today in order to decrypt it once a quantum computer capable of breaking the encryption exists.
Harvest now, decrypt later describes an adversary who cannot read intercepted traffic today and stores it anyway. Bulk capture and storage are cheap, the capability to break widely deployed public-key cryptography is expected rather than hypothetical, and nothing about the intercepted data expires in the meantime.
It reverses the usual reasoning about a security deadline. The question is not when a capable machine arrives but how long the data you are transmitting has to remain confidential, and for contracts, positions, designs, and personal data that horizon routinely exceeds any credible CRQC estimate. An organisation transmitting ten-year secrets over classical key exchange today has already missed the deadline, whatever the date turns out to be.
The mitigation is unglamorous: adopt post-quantum cryptography for data in transit ahead of the capability, because traffic already sent cannot be protected after the fact. That is the reasoning behind enabling it by default rather than on request.
Evidence that keeps pace with the decision.
Evaluate Nuclir against the systems, markets, and decisions that matter to your organization. The result is current intelligence with the context needed to use it responsibly.