The traffic captured today is the traffic decrypted later.

Nuclir delivers every response from the edge closest to the requesting node, secured by post-quantum cryptographic standards for data in transit. This page says why that is not early.

Harvest now, decrypt later is not a hypothetical.

Encrypted traffic can be recorded now and decrypted whenever the capability arrives. That makes the relevant question not when a cryptographically relevant machine exists, but how long the data you are sending today has to stay secret - and for most commercially sensitive traffic the answer is longer than any credible timeline. This is harvest now, decrypt later, and it is why the migration deadline is behind us rather than ahead.

The standards are not speculative either. National standards bodies have published lattice-based key establishment and signature schemes, and the migration guidance that goes with them, which means the engineering decision today is when to adopt rather than what to adopt.

Post-quantum in transit, at the edge, by default.

Every Nuclir response is served from the edge closest to the requesting node, in sub-millisecond time, with post-quantum cryptographic standards protecting data in transit. It is on by default rather than an enterprise option, because a security property that has to be requested is one most callers will not have.

Doing it at the edge is what makes it affordable. Key establishment is the expensive part of a post-quantum handshake, and terminating it as close to the caller as possible is the difference between a security upgrade and a latency regression - which matters when the consumer is an autonomous agent making a decision inside a request.

Four commitments a reviewer can test.

Each of these is something a security team can verify against the deployed service rather than take on description.

Post-quantum in transit

Standards-based post-quantum key establishment protecting data in transit, enabled by default.

Terminated at the edge

The handshake completes at the node closest to the caller, so the security property costs no round trip.

Keys managed, not embedded

Key material is managed and rotated rather than shipped inside a client or a configuration file.

Documented, not implied

What is protected, what is not, and what is still aspirational are all written down on the security page.

Stated plainly, because a security page is verified.

This is a statement about data in transit. Data at rest is encrypted by the managed services that hold it, on conventional standards, and we say so on the security page rather than letting one claim imply the other. Nor does any of it protect a credential a caller has leaked, or a system on the far side of an integration.

We also do not claim a certification we do not hold. Where a control is aspirational, it is described as aspirational; where an audit is not complete, the page says so. A vendor's security claims are checked by people whose job is checking them, and the only durable strategy is to be accurate.

Evidence that keeps pace with the decision.

Evaluate Nuclir against the systems, markets, and decisions that matter to your organization. The result is current intelligence with the context needed to use it responsibly.

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